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Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000500330001-9	25X1
SUMMARY	,
FAR EAST	
French forces in Tonkin are severely pressed (page 3). Karens may abandon demand for separate state in Burma (page 3).	
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EASTERN EUROPE	
Local political groups in Trieste clamor for elections (page 6).	
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FAR EAST

1.	French forces in Tonkin are severely pressed:
X1A	The US Military Attache at Hanoi states it is "very doubtful" that the military picture in Tonkin is as promising as the French
	publicly assert. The Viet Minh strategy of constant attacks against new points on the defense perimeter is tiring French troops by forcing them to make continual countermoves. The French are losing experienced and well-armed soldiers, while the Viet Minh is holding its best troops in reserve and committing only ill-equipped, untrained conscripts.
	The attache concludes that the "best French hope" at the moment is for the Viet Minh soon to cease general operations in order to recuperate and supply.
	Comment: An American official, just returned from the southern delta region within the defense perimeter, reports that the entire area is being infiltrated by Viet Minh forces, with only four towns securely held by the French. Announcements over the past weekend by the French that they are conducting an offensive in that area appear there fore to be misleading; actually, the operation has more the complexion of a defensive action involving troops badly needed elsewhere.
2.	Karens may abandon demand for separate state in Burma:
(1A	A spokesman for the Karen Congress, an organization composed of Karens in legal opposition to the Burmese Government, reportedly stated that the insurgent Karens will not insist upon the establishment of a separate state. They will, however,
	and and appear and obtained of a population batter. They will, however,
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demand that Karens who have been imprisoned or discharged from military or civil positions for political reasons be released or reinstated, and that Karens be guaranteed minority rights throughout Burma, including the right to their own educational system and equal commercial opportunities with Burmans.

The Karen Congress has been Comment: in constant touch with the insurgent Karens and it is plausible that this group would be utilized as an intermediary to transmit any offer by the insurgents to the government.

This report, if true, represents a considerable concession on the part of the Karens who have heretofore been intransigent in their demand for a separate state. Moreover, the reported concession is being offered at a time when the Burmese Communists have been holding out to the Karens the promise of such a state.

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